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By sending systems in specially prepared quantum states, two parties can com-
municate without an eavesdropper being able to listen. The technique, called
quantum cryptography, enables one to verify that the state of the quantum sys-
tem has not been tampered with, and thus one can obtain privacy regardless
of the power of the eavesdropper. All previous protocols relied on the ability
to faithfully send quantum states. In fact, until recently, they could all be re-
duced to a single protocol where security is ensured though sharing maximally
entangled states. Here we show this need not be the case – one can obtain ver-
ifiable privacy even through some channels which cannot be used to reliably
send quantum states.
The nature of quantum systems and our ability to manipulate the state they are in has had
a radical impact on the field of information theory and computation. A quantum computer can
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solve problems which a classical computer cannot, and photons prepared in special states can
be used to obtain privacy between two individuals sharing a fiber-optic channel – a situation
impossible classically. Researchers in quantum information theory are trying to understand
what aspects of quantum states and manipulations are responsible for the power of quantum
computation and cryptography.
In the case of cryptography the ability to faithfully send arbitrary quantum states (1) ap-
peared to lay at the heart of obtaining privacy. In the original protocol, BB84 (2), two-level
quantum systems such as photons were faithfully sent in eigenstates of one of two complemen-
tary basis, which allows both privacy and the faithful sending of quantum states. Equivalently,
entanglement based schemes (3) relied on the faithful distribution of maximally entangled pure
states, which again allows the transmission of arbitrary states. In reality, the quantum states
used in such protocols are so fragile that interaction with the environment (or the eavesdropper)
causes them to rapidly decohere. However, if there is not too much noise, one can perform
quantum error correction on the states, as one does in quantum computation, or post-processing
on the raw key, to overcome the noise. The environment and the eavesdropper then become
decoupled from the quantum states and the two parties can then obtain privacy.
Since all known protocols achieve privacy by decoupling the eavesdropper from the sent
states, there was much reason to assume that this is necessary. This implied that the faithful
sending of arbitrary quantum states (such as halves of maximally entangled states) appeared to
be a necessary precondition for privacy. In other words, all previous cryptographic schemes are
qualitatively equivalent to each other, and equivalent to distilling pure state entanglement. The
first step in showing that this need not be the case was in (4) in the scenario where trusted states
are given to the parties. There, we obtained the most general state which can produce a private
key upon measurement. One can then recast all of quantum cryptography as a protocol which
distills these private states under local operations and classical communication (LOCC). It was
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then shown that there exist private states which are not equivalent to pure state entanglement.
In fact, they can be produced from channels which have zero capacity (5, 6) – the channels
cannot be used to faithfully send arbitrary quantum states, but they can produce states which
are private. However, a key ingredient remained. For quantum key distribution (QKD) it is not
enough for two parties to share a private state, they must be able to verify this privacy. One
imagines a scenario where the eavesdropper actually gives the two parties the states, or the
parties produce the states through a channel which the eavesdropper can tamper with. One must
be able to verify that one indeed holds a private state and not something else.
Here, we provide a protocol which allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to verify that they
indeed possess private states using only LOCC. This works for all private states, even those
which can be created from zero-capacity channels, thus allowing us to obtain security over
channels which cannot be used to send quantum information. The protocol is thus inequiva-
lent to the original schemes. We previously (7) had introduced a protocol which worked over
channels which could have arbitrary small capacity, but the protocol cannot be extended to the
case where the capacity is strictly zero. Here, we will simply sketch the proof of security of our
protocol. The technical details are contained in the appendix as well as in (8).
Let us recall that there are two scenarios for QKD. In entanglement based schemes, an
adversary gives states to Alice and Bob and they distill pure entanglement in the form of the
maximally entangled state |Φd〉 := 1√d
∑d
i=1 |i〉A|i〉B where {|i〉} is a computational basis for
the local systems A and B possessed by Alice and Bob respectively. They then verify that
they indeed possess states very close to this form, and then measure in the computation basis
to produce a secure key. One also has prepare and measure protocols, where Alice prepares
a quantum state, sends it to Bob who then measures it in some basis. They then examine the
results to verify that the sent states were not overly tampered with, and then perform classical
post-processing on the results to obtain a key. The two schemes are equivalent in the sense that
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Figure 1: For a channel with non-zero capacity (left hand side), maximally entangled states can
be distributed such that measuring in any direction will produce a private key. The eavesdrop-
per is completely decoupled from the state. For the channel on the right hand side with zero
capacity, the distributed states only produce a private key if the measurement is made along the
blue axis. It can be shown that the eavesdropper must know at least one bit of information, but
due to the ancilla on A′B′ (the “shield”), the bit of information is not about the key.
current prepare and measure schemes can be reduced to protocols which rely on the distilla-
tion and verification of maximally entangled states as shown in (9). In (4) it was shown that
one could consider more general schemes where one considered protocols which rely on the
distillation of states of the form
γUd = U(|ΦdAB〉〈ΦdAB| ⊗ ρA′B′)U † (1)
U =
∑
ij
|ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ UijA′B′ (2)
and viewing any protocol as the distillation and verification of such private states. Here ρA′B′ is
an arbitrary ancilla, the UijA′B′ are arbitrary unitaries on it, and U is called twisting.
We now give the protocol for verifying private states, and prove its security. The protocol is
a twisted version of verification schemes of |Φd〉, and in the spirit of (9) we will prove security
of our protocol by reducing it to security of the protocol due to Lo and Chau (10). Let us recall
that the Lo-Chau protocol is as follows:
(1) Alice can locally prepare n systems in the state |Φ2〉 and distribute Bob’s share to him
through an untrusted channel where the eavesdropper can attack all of Bob’s share at once
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before it gets to him. After this step, they share the state ρ0.
(2) Perform tests (via public but authenticated discussion) on ρ0 by randomly selecting mx
and mz systems, and measuring σz⊗σz to estimate the bit error rate ǫx, and σx⊗σx to measure
the phase error rate ǫz. Here, the σ are the standard Pauli matrices. The error rates essentially
tell us how far ρ0 deviates from a maximally entangled state.
(3) Based on the results of the test, the parties perform an appropriate entanglement purifi-
cation protocol (EPP) to ρ0 and output a state γ˜ which will be close to the maximally entangled
state with high probability. One doesn’t need to know the exact form of ρ0, but only the error
rates.
(4) Generate a key by measuring γ˜ locally. The key can have varying size (depends on the
error rate), and zero key-length means “abort QKD.”
The security of this protocol rests on the fact that the estimates ǫx, ǫz of the two error rates
by random sampling will converge with high probability to their expectation values over the
entire initial state ρ0 thus ensuring that the final state γ˜ is close to maximally entangled. For
small δ and mz < ( 2δ
2
1+2δ2
)n, we have for example (10)
Pr( |ǫzP−ǫz| ≥ δ) ≤ 2e−2mzδ2 (3)
where ǫzP is the expectation value of the phase error rate. This result is from sampling theory
and can be found as Proposition 1 in the appendix.
We now wish to modify this protocol so that we can use it to verify private states, which
for the moment we take to be many copies of γU2 . In (4, 11, 12) examples of such states were
given which result from zero-capacity channels (i.e. they are bound entangled (13)), and thus
our protocol will work over such channels.
Since private states are twisted maximally entangled states, we could achieve verifiable
privacy, by untwisting the private state before each step of the protocol, so that we are just
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acting the above protocol on the maximally entangled state. We would thus need to modify the
protocol as follows:
(2’) Apply untwisting U⊗n† to ρ0, then estimate ǫx and ǫz on the (AB)⊗n systems as in the
original step (2), and finally reapply U⊗n.
(3’) Apply untwisting U⊗n†, measure out a “raw-key” in the computational basis of the
remaining n−mx−mz systems.
(4’) Perform error correction and privacy amplification on the raw-key via public discussion.
Such a protocol is unfeasible since U may be a global unitary and cannot be done using
only LOCC. However, it is secure, since if we were able to perform the twisting and untwisting,
the only difference between this protocol and that of the Lo-Chau one is that classical privacy
amplification (14) and error correction is used instead of the entanglement purification protocol
(EPP). This does not effect security, since it was shown (15,16) that there exist classes of EPPs
such that applying the EPP and measuring out a key can be securely converted to protocols
where a key is first measured out and then we apply classical error correction and privacy
amplification on the raw key to obtain a secure one. We now explain how to convert the above
unfeasible protocol to a feasible one which can be performed via LOCC.
First, in step (2’), for the n−mx−mz which are not used for testing, the twisting and un-
twisting cancel and therefore, do not need to be performed. Also, the measurement of bit errors
via σz ⊗ σz on AB commutes with the twisting and untwisting, and therefore, the twisting
and untwisting cancel. Similarly, in step (3’), the measurement commutes with the untwisting,
and therefore this untwisting is also unnecessary. Finally, for step (2’), untwisting the state,
estimating the expected number of phase errors, and retwisting is equivalent to estimating the
twisted phase error rate via the operator Σx = UABA′B′(σx ⊗ σx ⊗ IA′B′)U †ABA′B′ . Mercifully,
our only remaining task is to find a way to estimate this error rate via LOCC, rather than via
direct measuring of the global operator Γx.
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To do this, we will first decompose Σx in terms of products of observables which can be
locally measured by Alice and Bob. We then show that this estimation of the observable in
terms of these product observables is a good estimation. As will be explained shortly, this
involves adapting the quantum deFinetti theorem (17) and a Chernoff-like bound.
We can always decompose any observable into product observables. In particular:
Σx = UABA′B′(σx ⊗ σx ⊗ I)U †ABA′B′ (4)
=
t∑
ja,jb=1
sjajbOjaAA′ ⊗ OjbBB′ (5)
where {Oj}tj=1 is a basis (trace-orthonormal) for hermitian operators acting on AA′ and BB′,
and t = d2d′. Alice and Bob can now estimate the average value of Σx by dividing the mz
samples into t2 groups, and then estimating individually OjaAA′ and OjbBB′ on the ith test
system. They then multiply their results publicly, and finally sum these products over i =
1, · · · , mz/t2 with the coefficients given by Eq. (5).
The outcome of this LOCC estimation procedure will result in giving some emperical value
for the average of Σx, which we call 〈Σind〉emp. We want to compare 〈Σind〉emp to the emperical
value 〈Σ〉emp obtained from estimating Σx via a direct global measurement (which is the mea-
surement that is performed in the unfeasible yet secure modified Lo-Chau protocol). If the two
values are close, then we have shown that the LOCC measurement is a good estimation of Σx
Indeed 〈Σind〉emp will be close to 〈Σ〉emp if the entire mz sample systems are in a joint
tensor-power state ρ⊗n0 , and if the number of systems we test is large enough. This follows
from Eq. (5) and the fact that for tensor power states, we may regard each measurement as an
independent event. We can then use the Chernoff bound which states that a random sample of
k independent measurements of an operator O on state ρ⊗n will converge exponentially fast in
k to its average value O¯ = Tr(Oρ). More precisely, the probability that |O − O¯| ≥ δ decays
as ∼ e−Ckδ2 for C a positive constant. In this case we know that the estimate of each of the t2
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local measurements will converge exponentially fast to Tr(ρ0Oj) as we increase the number of
tested systems k = mz/t2.
However, in our current problem, Alice and Bob share ρ0 which is not a tensor-power state,
and each measurement cannot be considered to be an independent event. Fortunately, there is a
sense in which a random sampling of mz systems is close to tensor-power. First, permutation
symmetry can be imposed on the protocol (since we can choose a random sample in any order),
and second, since the estimation involves only a small portion (mz) of the entire n systems, the
exponential quantum deFinetti theorem (17) states that the measured (reduced) state is close to
a mixture of “almost-tensor-power-states”. This is captured by Theorem 2 of the appendix. We
can now apply a Chernoff-like bound to these almost-tensor-power-states. The exact analysis
involves many adaptations of the results in (17) and is given in the appendix as Theorem 1. The
result has consequences well beyond the current considerations. Essentially, any realizations of
an observable (i.e. a decomposition of the operator in terms of others), is a good one, in the
sense that performing one kind of measurement on m out of n systems via one realization of
the measurement, will yield average values which are well correlated with the values obtained
by performing another realization of the measurement on the remaining n − m systems. This
is captured in Theorem 3 of the appendix. We can apply this to the current case to show that
the probability that |〈Σind〉emp − 〈Σ〉emp| > δ can be made small. This says that the estimated
twisted phase errors through measuring a sample via LOCC is correlated with the result we
would obtain if we made an ideal measurement of twisted phase errors on the rest of system.
Thus in terms of security, the only difference between the modified protocol, and that of Lo-
Chau, is that instead of Equation 3 governing the accuracy of the phase error estimate, we have
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through Theorem 3
Pr |〈Σind〉(m)emp − 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp | > δ
≤ 2e−
(n−mz)(r+1)
2n
+
1
2
d4d′2 ln(n−mz)
+ (t2 + 1)2
−
»
δ2
36t2d2d′
−H( rt
2
mz
)
–
mz
t2
+d′d2 log(
mz
2t2
+1)
+ d′d2e−
mzδ2
72d′2d4t2 (6)
where the three expressions in the upper bound respectively come from the exponential quantum
deFinetti theorem, the Chernoff bound, and random sampling theory. Here, d is the dimension
of the maximally entangled state and we can take d = 2, d′ the dimension of each ancilla on
A′B′, and r is some natural number we will take to be ≥ d4d′2 lnn. The superscripts for the
emperical values of Σx refer to 〈Σind〉emp being measured using m systems while 〈Σ〉emp is
measured on the remaining n−m.
This then proves security of the entire scheme, since the only significant change from the
unfeasible modified protocol is a different method for estimating phase errors. The calculation
of security in terms of composable security parameters for QKD (18) is given in (8).
We now touch on several issues which arise. The protocol we have given, as with all entan-
glement based protocols, relies on keeping the quantum state ρ0 from decohering throughout the
procedure, and it is therefor not currently practical. However, it can be converted to a prepare-
and-measure protocol where Alice prepares a state, sends it down a channel (which might have
zero quantum capacity), and then Bob measures the state right away. The conversion adapts
well known techniques and is contained in (8) along with an example.
Next, in the above protocol, we considered verification of tensor powers of private states
with dimension two on A i.e. γ⊗n2 under general attacks. It is straightforward to extend this
to the verification of private states of any dimension, and states where the twisting is close to
tensor power. It is not clear whether one can extend this to private states which are not tensor
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power such as a single γd; as of yet we do not have a no-go theorem. This is quite different from
verification of pure state entanglement where the maximally entangled state of any dimension
can be written as |Φ2〉⊗n and we are thus always trying to verify something close to tensor
power.
Here, we considered a twisted version of the Lo-Chau scheme, but we could have just as
well considered twisted versions of other parameter estimation schemes. Indeed our protocol
is not optimal in its use of resources and it may be interesting to improve it. Some potential
avenues were noted in (8). A tomographic verification scheme was suggested originally in (4),
and it may be interesting to explore its efficiency. It is simpler in the sense that one could just
discard some states, and be left with almost-tensor-product states as in (17).
Finally, here we have demonstrated conceptually that quantum key distribution is not equiv-
alent to the ability to send quantum information. However, we only know of a few channels and
set of states which have the property of offering security without allowing quantum communi-
cation. It would be very interesting to find other examples, and perhaps even more interesting
to know whether there are any bound entangled states (and the corresponding zero-capacity
channels) which cannot produce a secure key.
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Appendix
In Section 1 we present Theorem 1 on the extent to which a permutationally invariant set of
systems behaves like independently and identically distributed (IID) states for the purpose of
parameter estimation. This is an application of the quantum de Finetti theorem and the gener-
alized Chernoff bound. Section 1.2 presents some results which will be used in Section 1.3. It
is in this latter section where the key Theorem 3 is presented in Subsection 1.3.3. It relates the
distance between direct measurements and indirect measurements of an observable.
1 LOCC estimation of the expectation of an IID observable
1.1 Finite quantum de Finetti theorem and generalized Chernoff bound
We say that a state ρn on Hilbert spaceH⊗n satisfies the Chernoff bound with respect to a state σ
onH and a measurementM onH if (with high probability) the frequency distribution obtained
by measuring M⊗n on ρn is close to that of measuring M on σ. For example, ρn = σ⊗n.
However many other states satisfy the same property. An important class is called almost power
states, which are formulated and studied in (17). We adapt results in (17) for our own purpose
in the following.
Theorem 1 (Finite quantum de Finetti theorem plus Chernoff bound) Consider any permu-
tationally invariant (possibly mixed) state ρn+k on Hilbert spaceH⊗(n+k). Let ρn = Trkρn+k be
the partial trace of ρn+k over k systems. Then there exists a probability measure µ on (possibly
mixed) states σ acting on H and a family of states ρ(σ)n,r such that
1. The state ρn is close to a mixture of the states ρ(σ)n,r∥∥∥∥ρn −
∫
ρ(σ)n,r dµ(σ)
∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ 2 e− k(r+1)2(n+k)+ 12 dim(H)2 ln k (7)
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2. The states ρ(σ)n,r (called almost power states) satisfy the Chernoff bound in the following
sense
Pr
(∥∥PM(σ)−QM(ρ(σ)n,r)∥∥ > δ)
≤ 2−n
h
δ
2
4
−h( r
n
)
i
+|W | log(n
2
+1)
=: e(δ) (8)
where M={Mw}w∈W is any measurement on H, PM(σ) = {Tr(σMw)}w, QM(ρ(σ)n,r) is
the frequency distribution obtained from measuring M⊗n on the state ρ(σ)n,r, and |W | is
the size of the alphabet W .
3. Reduced density matrices of the states ρ(σ)n,r (to n′ ≤ n systems) satisfy the same Chernoff
bound:
Pr(
∥∥∥PM(σ)−QM(ρ(σ)n,r,n′)∥∥∥ > δ)
≤ 2−n′
h
δ
2
4
−h( r
n′
)
i
+|W | log(n
′
2
+1) (9)
where r ≤ n′/2 and ρ(σ)n,r,n′ = Trn−n′ρ(σ)n,r is the partial trace of ρ(σ)n,r over n− n′ systems.
Proof: We first collect various facts, definitions, and results from (17).
1.1.1 Facts and definitions
Definition 1 Almost power state: (Def. 4.1.4, in (17)) Suppose 0 ≤ r ≤ n. Let Sym(H⊗n)
denote the symmetric subspace of pure states of Hilbert spaceH⊗n. Let |θ〉 ∈ H be an arbitrary
pure state and consider:
V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) := {π(|θ〉⊗n−r ⊗ |ψr〉) : π ∈ Sn,
|ψr〉 ∈ H⊗r}
where Sn is the permutation group of the n systems. We define the almost power states along
|θ〉 to be the set of pure states in
|θ〉[⊗,n,r] := Sym(H⊗n) ∩ span(V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r)) (10)
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We denote the set of mixtures of almost tensor power states along |θ〉 as conv(|θ〉[⊗,n,r]).
With the above definition, we shall prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If ̺n ∈ conv(|θ〉[⊗,n,r]), then, ̺n−m ∈ conv(|θ〉[⊗,n−m,r]) where ̺n−m = Trm(̺n) is
the reduced density matrix after the partial trace over any m out of the n systems (by symmetry,
without loss of generality, we take the first m systems).
Proof .-
Since membership in conv(|θ〉[⊗,n−m,r]) is preserved under mixing, it suffices to prove the
lemma for pure ̺n = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, with |Ψ〉 ∈ |θ〉[⊗,n,r].
We can pick an ensemble realizing ̺n−m of our choice, and prove the lemma by showing
that any element |Ψn−m〉 in that ensemble belongs to |θ〉[⊗,n−m,r]. Our ensemble is obtained by
an explicit partial trace of |Ψn〉 over the first m subsystems along the computational basis. An
element is given by
|Ψn−m〉 = 〈i1|...〈im| ⊗ In−m|Ψn〉. (11)
Now, we note two facts:
(i) |Ψn−m〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗(n−m)) – This is because |Ψn〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗(n)) = span(|φ〉⊗n).
(ii) |Ψn−m〉 ∈ V(H⊗n−m, |θ〉⊗(n−m−r)) – This is because |Ψn〉 ∈ V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r), and
expressing |Ψn〉 in terms of the spanning vectors of V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) and putting it into Eq. (11),
we have
|Ψn−m〉 =
∑
Ψr ,π
αΨr ,π〈i1| · · · 〈im| ⊗ In−m π (|θ〉⊗n−r ⊗ |Ψr〉).
Elementary analysis shows that any term of the above sum is, up to permutation, of the form
(〈i1|θ〉) · · · (〈ip|θ〉)|θ〉⊗n−r−p⊗ [〈ip+1| · · · 〈im|⊗Ir−(m−p) π′(|Ψr〉)] where 0 ≤ p ≤ m, and “ab-
sorbing”m−p copies of θ to the last part of the vector, we get |θ〉⊗n−(r+m)⊗|Ψ′′r〉. Thus, |Ψm−n〉
is a sum of terms of the form π(|θ〉⊗n−(r+m)⊗ |Ψ′′r〉), and belongs to V(H⊗(n−m), |θ〉⊗n−(r+m)).
This proves the second fact, and also the lemma. 
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Property of a mixture of almost tensor power states behaves approximately like a mixture
of tensor power states, so that the generalized version of Chernoff bound holds.
Lemma 2 (Theorem 4.5.2 of (17)) Let M = {Mw}w∈W be a POVM on H, let 0 ≤ r ≤ n2 .
Moreover let |θ〉 ∈ H and let |Ψn〉 be a vector from |θ〉[⊗,n,r]. There holds:
P (||PM(|θ〉〈θ|)− PM[|Ψn〉〈Ψn|]|| > δ)
≤ 2−n
h
δ
2
4
−h( r
n
)
i
+|W | log(n
2
+1)
=: e(δ)
where PM(|θ〉〈θ|) = {Tr|θ〉〈θ|Mw}w and PM[|Ψn〉〈Ψn|] is the frequency distribution of out-
comes of M⊗n applied to |Ψn〉〈Ψn|, and the probability is taken over those outcomes. Note
that we have used e(δ) instead of δ(e) in (17).
Consider the general probability Pr(‖PM(ρ)−PM[̺n]‖ < δ) where PM[̺n] is a frequency
distribution of outcomes of M⊗n applied to |Ψn〉〈Ψn|. The distribution PM[̺n], if treated as a
functional of ̺n on the space H⊗n, is linear in ̺n. Following this we get immediately:
Corollary 1 Lemma 2 holds when replacing the projector |Ψn〉〈Ψn| (for |Ψn〉 ∈ |θ〉[⊗,n,r]) by
̺n ∈ conv(|θ〉[⊗,n,r]).
Apart form the generalised Chernoff-type lemmas, we also need the crucial exponential
quantum finite deFinetti theorem:
Theorem 2 (Theorem 4.3.2 of (17)) For any pure state |ψn+k〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n+k) and 0 ≤ r ≤ n
there exists a measure dν(|θ〉) on H and for each |θ〉 ∈ H a pure state |ψ(θ)n 〉 ∈ |θ〉[⊗,n,r] such
that ∥∥∥∥Trk|ψn+k〉〈ψn+k| −
∫
H
|ψ(θ)n 〉〈ψ(θ)n |dν(|θ〉)
∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ 2e− k(r+1)2(n+k)+ 12 dim(H) ln k (12)
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Finally, we need the fact that any permutationally invariant state has a symmetric purification.
Lemma 3 (Lemma 4.2.2 of (17)) Let ρn be permutationally invariant state on H. Then there
exists purification of the state on Sym((H⊗H)⊗n)
This concludes the list of facts and definitions needed for proving Theorem 1.
1.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider an arbitrary permutationally invariant state ̺n+k on Hilbert space H⊗(n+k).
Step (1): According to Lemma 3 there is a purification |ψn+k〉 that belongs to Sym(H′⊗n+k)
where H′ = H⊗ H˜ and dim(H˜) =dim(H).
Step (2): We apply to ψn+k theorem 2 with the changes
H → H′ = H⊗ H˜
d → d2 (13)
Step (3): After application of theorem 2 we perform partial trace over H˜⊗n, the purifying spaces
introduced in (1). We denote this partial trace by T˜r. This partial trace induces from the measure
on H′ in step (2) the new measure µ(σ) on the set of all mixed states σ defined on H. (This is
defined by probability ascribed by the measure µ to the subset of H′ equal to the equivalence
class of all pure states |θ〉 which satisfy T˜r(|θ〉〈θ|) = σ). This partial trace produces also the
states ρ(σ)n,r defined directly by ρ(σ)n,r ≡ T˜r(|ψ(θ)n 〉〈ψ(θ)n |) where the existence of the pure states
|ψ(θ)n 〉 is guaranteed by theorem 2. Finally we note that partial trace does not increase the trace
distance between two quantum states, so applying partial trace to the LHS of (12) and using the
notation described above we get immediately the inequality (7). This proves the first item of
Theorem (1).
To prove the second item of Theorem (1), remember from the above that ρ(σ)n,r ≡ T˜r(|ψ(θ)n 〉〈ψ(θ)n |).
Since |ψ(θ)n 〉 is an almost power pure state, lemma 2 applies. Further, it holds for all POVM-s on
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H′ = H⊗ H˜, and in particular for incomplete POVM-s acting only on H but not on H˜. Thus,
the conclusion of lemma 2 holds with the change: M→M⊗ I , which gives item (2).
Finally, to prove item 3 of theorem 1, note that the reduced density matrices ̺σn,r,n′ of interest
can be obtained from the pure state |ψ(θ)n 〉 above by tracing (i) first over n − n′ subsystems
corresponding toH′, producing a state onH′⊗n′ , and (ii) then over n′ subsystems corresponding
to H˜.
Then lemma 1 guarantees that the first partial trace produces a mixed state ̺n′ in conv(|θ〉[⊗,n′,n′−r])
(with underlying space H′. Applying corollary 1 to ̺n′ with n′ instead of n, it suffices to
consider a pure state in |θ〉[⊗,n′,n′−r]. Finally, lemma 2 can be applied to this pure state with
M→M⊗ I which concludes item 3 (with the assumption 0 ≤ r ≤ n′
2
). 
1.2 Two other useful results
1.2.1 Classical random sampling
In addition to the fact and definitions above and Theorem 1, we will need the following result
on classical random sampling (or equivalently symmetric probability distribution).
Proposition 1 (Classical sampling theory) Lemma A.4 from (19). Let Z be an n-tuple and
Z ′ a k-tuple of random variables over set Z , with symmetric joint probability P . Let Qz′ be a
frequency distribution of a fixed sequence z′ and Q(z,z′) be frequency distribution of a sequence
(z, z′). Then for every ǫ ≥ 0 we have
P (||Q(z,z′) −Qz′|| ≥ ǫ) ≤ |Z|e−kǫ2/8|Z|. (14)
The result says that frequency obtained from a small sample is close to frequency distribution
obtained from the whole system.
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1.2.2 From probabilities to averages
Lemma 4 Consider an observable L on Hilbert space H, dimH = d. Let L = ∑ti=1 siLi,
where Li satisfy TrLiL†j = δij . Let eigenvalues of Li be denoted by λ(i)l . Consider arbitrary
state ρ, and let P (i) = {p(i)l } be the probability distribution on l (which eigenvalue) induced by
measuring Li on ρ. Let Q(i) = {q(i)l } be an arbitrary family of distributions on eigenvalues of
Li. We then have
|〈L〉ρ −
∑
i
si
∑
l
λ
(i)
l q
(i)
l |
≤
√
t||L||HS max
i
||P (i) −Q(i)||, (15)
where ‖ · ‖HS is the Hilbert-Schmidt norm, ‖ · ‖∞ is the operator norm, and ‖ · ‖ is the trace
norm.
Proof ∣∣∣∣∣〈L〉ρ −
∑
i
si
∑
l
λ
(i)
l q
(i)
l
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
si
∑
l
λ
(i)
l (p
(i)
l −q(i)l )
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i
|si| (max
l
|λ(i)l |) ‖P (i) −Q(i)‖
=
∑
i
si‖Li‖∞ ‖P (i) −Q(i)‖
≤ (max
j
‖P (j) −Q(j)‖)
∑
i
si ‖Li‖∞ (16)
Since ||Li||∞ = 1, using convexity of x2 we obtain
t∑
i=1
si ‖Li‖∞ =
∑
i
si ≤
√
t
√∑
i
s2i =
√
t ‖L‖HS (17)
which ends the proof. 
17
1.3 Estimation - detailed description
We consider 2m + n systems with Hilbert space H⊗(2m+n), dimH = d in a permutationally
invariant state ̺2m+n. Suppose the ultimate goal is to obtain the “frequency mean-value” of
some single-system observable Σ on n + m systems. In other words, we want to measure
1
N
∑N
j=1Σ
(j) where Σ(j) = I ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ Σ⊗ · · · ⊗ I on the N subsystems for N = n+m.
Because of experimental limitations (here, it is the LOCC constraints on Alice and Bob),
they are restricted to measuring product operators of the form L = LA ⊗ LB by independently
finding the eigenvalues of LA and LB (i.e., making the measurements LA ⊗ I and I ⊗ LB),
discussing over classical channels and multiplying their outcomes together. Now, to measure
Σ, one can first rewrite it in terms of product operators Li:
Σ =
t∑
i=1
siLi (18)
where we have chosen {Li} to be hermitian and trace orthonormal, so that si are real. The Li-s
are “intermediate observables.” We will describe an inference scheme that (1) involves only the
estimation of the “frequency mean-value” of Σ on a small number (m) of subsystems, and (2)
the measurement of Σ is done indirectly via measurements of the Li’s.
The analysis will start with special assumption about the 2m-element sample, m of which
are used for indirect estimation. The assumptions are relaxed on that sample. After that proper-
ties of the other m+ n subsystems are inferred.
1.3.1 Analysis of the 2m sample in an “almost power state along σ”:̺(σ)2m,r
Suppose the first 2m subsystems are in a joint state ̺(σ)2m,r, with r ≤ 12 ×2m. We expect the state
̺
(σ)
2m,r to play a role similar to the state σ⊗2m. Define the theoretical direct average
〈Σ〉σ = Tr(Σσ) =
∑
i
si〈Li〉σ (19)
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We will show that the empirical average, either obtained directly or indirectly, will be close to
the above.
For the indirect measurement, divide the first m subsystems into t groups. Each group
has m′ = m/t subsystems. Alice and Bob take the ith group (i = 1, · · · , t) and measure Li
on each site as described above (the measurement is Li). In other words, the measurement
M indirect = ⊗ti=1(L⊗m
′
i ) is applied to the first m subsystems of the entire 2m + n subsystems.
The reduction of the state ̺(σ)2m,r to the first m subsystems induces probability distribution P on
the outcomes of M indirect.
Since we expect ̺(σ)2m,r and σ⊗m to behave similarly, consider the probability distribution on
alphabet Ai of observable Li =
∑
l λ
i
lP
(i)
l induced by the state σ as follows:
Pi = {Tr(σP l)}l (20)
An execution of the measurement L⊗m′i gives a particular outcome (l1, ..., lm′) and induces
frequency distribution Qi on alphabet Ai of the observable Li.
Then, the empirical frequency distributions Qi is close to the “theoretical” distribution Pi:
Fact 1
P(‖Pi −Qi‖ ≥ δ) ≤ e(δ,m′, r, d), (21)
where d is the dimension of the single site Hilbert space, and
e(δ, n, r, |Z|) := 2−( δ
2
4
−H( r
n
))n+|Z| log(n
2
+1) (22)
Proof - Follows immediately from the third item of Theorem 1. Note that we use item (3)
not (2) since we perform the measurement only on part of the state ̺(σ)2m,r.
Remark - Note also that Pi is constant while Qi is a random variable.
Now, we define the theoretical average values for the intermediate observables Li’s:
〈Li〉σ = Tr(Liσ) (23)
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and the empirical average
〈Li〉emp =
∑
l
λ
(i)
l Qi(l) (24)
where Qi(l) denotes value of Qi on specific event l from alphabet Ai. (Again, 〈Li〉σ is constant
while 〈Li〉emp is a random variable depending on the particular outcomes of measurement -
recall that Li =
∑
i λ
(i)
l P¯
(i)
l ). And again, recall that we the empirical value of Σ obtained
indirectly, via empirical distributions of the Li.
〈Σind〉(m)emp =
∑
i
si〈Li〉emp . (25)
We now show that the indirect empirical average is close to the direct theoretical average in
Eq. (19). First applying the union bound to Fact 1, we get
P(∪i=1,...,t{||Pi −Qi|| > δ}) ≤ t · e(δ,m′, r, d) (26)
Then using Lemma 4 we obtain thatP (|∑ti si〈Li〉σ−∑ti si〈Li〉emp| > δ) ≤ t·e( δ||Σ||HS√t , m′, r, d)
which is just
P(|〈Σ〉σ − 〈Σind〉(m)emp| > δ) ≤ t · e(
δ
||Σ||HS
√
t
,m′, r, d). (27)
After considering the indirect measurements, suppose that someone measures directlyMdirect =∑2m
j=m+1Σ
(j) on the second group of m subsystems. The empirical average outcome is given
by
〈Σ〉(m)emp =
∑
x
γxQ(x) (28)
where Q is the frequency distribution on the alphabet of Σ (similarly as Qi is the frequency
distribution of alphabetAi of Li), and γx are some real numbers. In a way similar to the indirect
case (but much easier here) we show that the empirical direct average is close to Eq. (19):
P(|〈Σ〉σ − 〈Σ〉(m)emp| > δ) ≤ e(
δ
||Σ||HS , m, r, d). (29)
From the inequalities (27), (29) we obtain
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Lemma 5 For the measurements on the state ̺(σ)2m,r considered above we have:
P(|〈Σ〉(m)emp − 〈Σind〉(m)emp| > 2δ)
≤ t · e( δ||Σ||HS
√
t
,m′, r, d) + e(
δ
||Σ||HS , m, r, d)
≤ (t+ 1)e( δ||Σ||HS
√
t
,m′, r, d) (30)
Proof .- Here triangle inequality and union bound to inequalities (27), (29) suffices together
with the properties of e(δ, n, r, d).
1.3.2 Passing from ̺(σ)2m,r-s to their integrals and then to a close-by state
Note that both integration and the measurement of a state to produce the classical distribution
of the outcomes are both linear, completely positive, and trace-preserving maps. Thus, Lemma
5 still holds under the replacement ̺(σ)2m,r →
∫
̺
(σ)
2m,rdµ(σ). Furthermore, if
||̺2m −
∫
̺
(σ)
2m,rdµ(σ)|| ≤ ǫ (31)
and since the trace distance is nonincreasing under the measurement (a TCP map), the output
distribution is different by no more than ǫ. In this way we have proven
Lemma 6 For a state ̺2m of 2m systems satisfying ||̺2m −
∫
̺
(σ)
2m,rdµ(σ)|| ≤ ǫ we have
P ′(|〈Σ〉(m)emp − 〈Σind〉(m)emp| > 2δ)
≤ (t + 1)e( δ||Σ||HS
√
t
,m′, r, d) + ǫ. (32)
where P ′ is the probability distribution on outcomes of measurement L⊗m′1 ⊗ ...⊗L⊗m
′
t ⊗M⊗m
induced by the state ̺2m.
1.3.3 Inferring direct average on n + m samples of general state ̺2m+n from indirect
measurements on m samples
Now we pass to the general permutationally invariant state ̺2m+n. We want to relate the distance
between 〈Σind〉(m)emp, the indirect estimation of Σ obtained via LOCC measurements {Li} on
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m of the systems, and the direct estimation 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp of Σ, we would obtain via the direct
measurement M on the other n+m systems. We have the following:
Theorem 3 Consider permutationally invariant state ̺2m+n on H⊗2m+n and dimH = d. On
this state we perform the measurement L⊗m′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ L⊗m
′
t ⊗M⊗m+n which induces the prob-
ability measure P ′′. (Note that P ′ from Lemma 6 is simply the marginal of P ′′.) Then we have
P ′′(|〈Σind〉(m)emp − 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp )| > 3δ) ≤ e1 + e2 + e3 (33)
where
e1 = 2e
− n(r+1)
2(2m+n)
+ 1
2
d2 lnn, (34)
e2 = (t+ 1)2
−( δ2
4t||Σ||2
HS
−H( r
m′
))m′+d log(m
′
2
+1) (35)
and
e3 = de
− mδ2
8d||Σ||2
HS . (36)
where || · ||HS is the Hilbert-Schmidt norm.
Proof - The parameters e1,e2, e3 come from the generalised quantum de Finetti theorem,
Chernoff bound and sampling proposition respectively.
To start with the proof note that from Theorem 1, item 1 we get that for ̺2m = Trn̺2m+n
we have ||̺2m −
∫
̺
(σ)
2m,rdµ(σ)|| ≤ ǫ with ǫ = e1. Applying then Lemma 6 we get that
P ′(|〈Σ〉(m)emp − 〈Σind〉(m)emp| > 2δ) ≤ e1 + e2 (37)
Now we need to connect 〈Σind〉(m)emp with 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp . For this we need sampling Proposition
1 P ′′(||QmΣ − Qm+nΣ || > δ) ≤ de−mδ
2/8d where Qmσ is the frequency distribution on outputs of
M induced by the state ρm (partial trace of ρ2m+n over m+ n systems and Qm+nσ is frequency
distribution induced on outcomes of M by state ρm+n (partial trace of ρ2m+n over m systems)
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and d is the dimension of elementary Hilbert space H (thus ̺2m is defined on H⊗2m. Using
Lemma 4 we go to the averages
P ′′(|〈Σ〉(m)emp − 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp | > 3δ) ≤ e3. (38)
Applying the union bound to Eqs. (37) and (38) we get finally the statement of the theorem.
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